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Abstract 
 
Purpose- The study investigates the role of inclusive human development and military 
expenditure in modulating the effect of terrorism on governance. 
 
Design/methodology/approach- It is based on 53 African countries for the period 1998-2012 
and interactive Generalised Method of Moments is employed. Six governance indicators from 
the World Bank and two terrorism variables are used, namely: domestic and transnational 
terrorism dynamics. 
 
Findings- The following main findings are established. There is a negative net effect on 
governance (regulation quality and corruption-control) when inclusive human development is 
used to reduce terrorism. There is a positive net impact on governance (“voice and 
accountability” and rule of law) when military expenditure is used to reduce domestic 
terrorism.  
 
Originality/value- We have complemented the sparse literature on the use of policy variables 
to mitigate the effect of policy syndromes on macroeconomic outcomes.  
 
 
JEL Classification: C52; D74; F42; O38 ; P37  
Keywords: Terrorism; Inclusive development; Governance; Africa 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 There are three fundamental motives for assessing the roles of military expenditure 
and inclusive development in modulating the effect of terrorism on governance in Africa, 
namely:  (i) growing terrorism levels in the continent; (ii) gaps in the literature on the 
governance-terrorism nexus and (iii) debates in the roles of military expenditure and inclusive 
development in reducing terrorism. In what follows, we engage the points chronologically.   
 First, terrorism is flourishing and good governance is deteriorating in Africa 
(Clavarino, 2014). According to the narrative, poor governance and the mushrooming of 
terrorists’ activities in Africa are closely related. Some features of bad governance are also 
flourishing because of terrorism, notably: vulnerable and corrupt central governments; 
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undertrained and underequipped armies; booming trade in drugs and porous borders. The 
growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the continent has led to political instability in many 
regions. Some notable cases include: Ansar Dine, led by a former close ally of Gaddafi, Iyad 
Ag Ghaly; Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia; Al-Qaeda-linked Mulathameen Brigade led by the 
Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Asongu et al, 2018a).  
 While the phenomenon of terrorism is not entirely new in the continent, the rate of 
increase in this trend represents a substantial policy syndrome (Alfa-Wali et al., 2015)2. 
Moreover, while global attention is currently oriented towards the Middle East and pockets of 
terrorism attacks in Europe, Africa is not receiving the scholarly attention it deserves in spite 
of growing radicalisation and Islamic fundamentalism (Fazel, 2013; Clavarino, 2014). 
 Second, while much of the literature has been oriented towards the role of governance 
in reducing terrorism, very limited research has been focused on the effect of terrorism on 
governance. Moreover, the literature on whether governance mitigates or promotes terrorism 
has been the object of intense debate (see Lee, 2013). On the one hand, a strand of the 
literature is positioned on the fact that governance can mitigate the probability of terrorism by 
limiting resentment vis-à-vis that State (Li, 2005; Windsor, 2003). On the other hand, another 
strand of the literature posits that good governance does not reduce terrorism (Gause, 2005), 
probably because the interests of terrorists’ may not be represented in government institutions 
of democratic politics. Accordingly, nations with a relatively better degree of democracy 
could host terrorism due to some characteristics in these nations that are compatible with the 
growth of terrorism. These encompass inter alia: freedom of speech in the expression of 
disagreement and dissatisfaction by citizens, access and freedom to media and civil liberties 
(Ross, 1993).  
Theories of political access postulate that the nexus between terrorism and good governance is 
weak (Eyerman, 1998), because of characteristics like: more feasible conditions for the 
management of conflicts (Li, 2005); respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010) and judicial 
independence (Findley & Young, 2011). Conversely, another branch of the literature is of the 
position that terrorism is more likely to be associated with government instability and poor 
governance (Piazza, 2008a; Lai, 2007). The latter view is in accordance with a broad stream 
of studies (Piazza, 2007; Schmid, 1992; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994). The underlying literature 
                                                 
2
 According to Fosu (2013), policy syndromes represent conditions that are detrimental to economic prosperity, 
notably: ‘administered redistribution’, ‘state breakdown’, ‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal 
resource allocation’. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017a) consider policy syndrome as economic prosperity that is 
not inclusive whereas with regards to Asongu (2017), understand the concept in terms of knowledge economy 
gaps. Within the framework of this paper, policy syndromes are terrorism dynamics, notably: domestic terrorism 
and transnational terrorism. 
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hinges on reverse causality in order to articulate how the extant literature on the positioning of 
this study is sparse. 
 The sparse literature on causality flowing from terrorism to governance (Section 2.3) 
has established that terrorism affects political parties (Indridason,  2008), election 
anticipations (Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Siqueira & Sandler, 2007), “voice and accountability” 
and political stability/no violence (Indridason, 2008; Williams, 2012), political governance 
(Jacobson, 2003; Langer & Cohen, 2005), the outcome of political elections (Kibris, 2010), 
economic governance (Tabor, 2016), the rule of law (Efobi & Asongu (2016) and most 
dimensions of World Governance Indicators negatively (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b). We 
complement the underlying literature by introducing policy variables of inclusive 
development and military expenditure in the assessment of how these policy variables can be 
used to mitigate the established negative effect of terrorism on governance. Such positioning 
also contributes to the scholarly debate on the relevance of these policy variables in fighting 
terrorism.  
 Third, the literature on the role of policy in reducing terrorism has been mixed at best. 
Some notable policy tools include military expenditure and inclusive development. While 
some theoretical and empirical evidence on the linkage between military expenditure and 
terrorism is inconclusive with negative, positive and insignificant effects (Feridun &  
Shahbaz, 2010), other  theoretical and empirical literature on the linkage between inclusive 
development and poverty on terrorism is also conflicting. Accordingly, there is no linkage 
between terrorism and economic development (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003); a negative 
relationship between terrorism and economic development (Li, 2005); the absence  of 
causality flowing from human development to terrorism (Piazza, 2006); more likelihood of 
terrorism in poor nations (Abadie, 2006); a positive relationship between terrorism and 
economic development when victims’ views are accounted-for (Gassenbner & Luechinger, 
2011); minority discrimination in the economy not positively influencing domestic terrorism 
(Piazza, 2011) and the positive relationship between economic development and transnational 
terrorism (Blomberg et al., 2014). Ultimately, there is mild empirical support for the positive 
nexus between terrorism and poverty, with the exceptions of Li and Schaub (2004) and Piazza 
(2011).  
The present study integrates the three main strands above by: positioning the inquiry 
on Africa, assessing the effect of terrorism on governance and investigating the role of 
inclusive development and military expenditure in modulating the effect of terrorism on 
governance. For this purpose the study employs six governance indicators representing: 
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political governance (political stability/non violence, voice and accountability), economic 
governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional governance 
(corruption-control and the rule of law).  
The research question the study aims to answer is therefore the following: how do 
military expenditure and inclusive development modulate the effect of terrorism on 
governance? In order to address this question, the approach to net effect from interactive 
regressions is employed because it is consistent with the recent literature on the use of policy 
variables to modulate the effect of policy syndromes on development outcomes (Asongu, 
2018).  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: The theoretical underpinnings are 
discussed in Section 2. The data and methodology are engaged in Section 3, while Section 4 
presents and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings  
2.1 Governance and terrorism  
 While there are several papers on measuring governance (Jong-a-Pin, 2009; Langbein 
& Knack, 2010; Bang & Mitra, 2011; Kuncic, 2013), the focus of the current study is on the 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) governance indicators from the World Bank because of their wide 
usage in the literature, especially because they do not map distinctly into single, unique 
concepts (Langbein & Knack, 2010)3. While some overlap may be apparent, especially given 
their high substitution from the perspective of correlation coefficients and exploratory factor 
analysis (Bang &  Mitra, 2011;  Kuncic, 2013), there are conceptual differences in the 
measurement of the variable that should be articulated. Political governance (voice and 
accountability and political stability/non violence) is defined as the election and replacement 
of political leaders. Economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness) 
is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. 
Institutional governance (corruption-control and the rule of law) is defined as the respect by 
the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them.  
 Terrorism, according to Enders and Todd (2006), is the threatened use of force by sub-
national actors for the goal of employing intimidation to secure political goals. Therefore, the 
definition and conception of terrorism is designed to affect political governance, negatively or 
positively. Within the framework of this study, we dispute that the linkage can be extended to 
                                                 
3
 In the interest of brevity, the interested reader can find more insights into why these governance indicators 
enjoy wide usage in Asongu (2016). 
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other dimensions of governance, namely: institutional and economic governances.  On the one 
hand, institutional governance can be affected by terrorism when the State and/or citizens fail 
to respect institutions that govern interactions between them. On the other hand, economic 
governance can be influenced by terrorism because violent mechanisms can be employed to 
manifest grievances on the poor formulation and implementation of measures that deliver 
public goods.  
 The theoretical foundations connecting governance and terrorism can be engaged in 
three principal strands: links between governance and domestic terrorism; the relationship 
between transnational terrorism and governance and debates surrounding the relationship.   
 First, consistent with Choi (2010), the nexus between domestic terrorism and 
governance is based on the perspective that ordinary citizens are endowed with incentives to 
utilise violence against political figures, government institutions and other citizens, under 
three scenarios, notably, when citizens:  have grievances; find no pacific mechanisms by 
which to quell their sentiments of desperation and hopelessness and; view the use of terror 
tactics as a viable and legitimate means of communicating their frustration and anger. The 
foundations of this postulation rest on the intuition that terrorism can be employed by citizens 
as means towards influencing government policies when no pacific alternatives are available. 
Hence, within these circumstances, in order to manifest their grievances, citizens are likely to 
use terrorism mechanisms to influence institutional, economic and political governances.  
Second, with respect to the nexus between governance and transnational terrorism, 
good governance is expected to reinforce institutional, economic and political governances 
and to also provide nonviolent avenues by which grievances can be attenuated (see Choi, 
2010).  
 In addition, domestic governments can be influenced by transnational terrorism in 
view of improving standards of government in order to further prevent contagion of domestic 
conflicts and terrorism. The theoretical governance-‘transnational terrorism’ linkage is 
feasible because foreign policy can be influenced by transnational terrorism. This narrative 
aligns with the results of Savun and Phillips (2009) who demonstrate that regardless of types 
of political regimes, transnational terrorism is linked with foreign policy because a foreign 
policy of a nation affects resentment abroad and transnational terrorism is a mechanism by 
which domestic governments can be influenced to change their foreign policies.  
With the understanding of above narratives, it is logical to postulate that terrorism can 
influence, inter alia: (i) institutional governance or the respect by citizens and the State of 
institutions that govern interactions between them; (ii) economic governance or the 
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formulation and implementation of policies that provide public goods to citizens and (iii) 
political governance or free and fair democratic process for the election and replacement of 
political leaders.   
The theoretical foundations on the relationship between governance and terrorism in 
the third strand are conflicting. Consistent with Hoffman et al. (2013), inquiries into the nexus 
between governance and cross-national terrorism are based on the scholarship that violent 
mechanisms can be employed to exploit differences in regime-types. Within this scenario, it is 
more likely that terrorism is used to influence bad governance, compared to good governance. 
Nonetheless, it is relevant to balance the narrative with the perspective that there are more 
opportunities available for citizens to air their grievances within the framework of good 
governance. Conversely, the liberties offered by good governance with democratic institutions 
can be abused by recalcitrant citizens who might yet employ violence to resolve their 
grievances.  
It is also interesting to note that violence is more likely to be employed as a 
mechanism of influencing governance in failing and/or failed states relative to autocracies that 
enjoy relative stability (Piazza 2008a; Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2007; Drakos & Gofas, 2006; 
Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Schmid, 1992). Conversely, theories of political access postulate 
that the nexus between terrorism and good governance is weak (Eyerman, 1998), because of 
characteristics like: more feasible conditions for the management of conflicts (Li, 2005); 
respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010) and judicial independence (Findley & Young, 2011). 
 The empirical literature has also substantially documented the linkage between 
governance institutions and transnational terrorism (Lee, 2013; Piazza, 2007, 2008b; Eubank 
& Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Weinberg & Eubank, 1998). Chenoweth (2010) has argued that 
good governance that is characterised by democratic competition can avail feasible conditions 
for violence. Two competing effects on the role of democracy are apparent (see Li, 2005): 
Government constraints can boost transnational terrorism due to deadlock from checks and 
balances. Moreover, the likelihood of transnational terrorism is reduced by democratic 
participation.  
 
2.2 The relevance of military expenditure and inclusive development in fighting 
terrorism  
2.2.1 Linkage between military expenditure and terrorism  
The literature is tied to the reverse relationship in order to articulate how the extant literature 
is sparse on the positioning of the study. There are two main theoretical perspectives on the 
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nexus between military spending and terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). According to the 
first perspective, terrorism boosts military spending because more funds in defense are 
devoted to respond to increasing threats of terrorism. Hence, when military spending is the 
dependent variable, a positive relationship is anticipated. The second perspective reasons that 
increasing military expenditure is also anticipated to mitigate terrorism, considering that 
measures towards increasing military spending are motivated by the goal of combating 
terrorism. Therefore, from a theoretical angle, terrorism and defense spending portray a 
negative nexus when the former is the dependent variable.  
 From an empirical perspective, the underlying relationship is also very conflicting. 
There is some consensus in the literature that military expenditure does not necessarily 
mitigate terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010, p.195). In other words, measures of counter-
terrorism are counter-productive because they increase terrorism instead of preventing attacks 
(see Sandler, 2005). Moreover, the absence of comprehensive and common international 
long-term policies that can be used to fight terrorism renders country-specific counter-
terrorism policies ineffective (Omand, 2005). In addition, policies towards combating 
terrorism that are adopted by the countries such as the United States are not effective because 
such policies instead increase the probability of terrorism (Lum et al., 2006). Feridun and 
Shahbaz (2010) have established a uni-directional causality from terrorism to military 
expenditure. In the light of the above, the relationship between military expenditure and 
terrorism is still open to debate because of the absence of a consensus in empirical literature.  
 
2.2.2 Linkage between inclusive development and terrorism  
 In this section, the literature is also tied to the reverse relationship in order to articulate 
how the extant literature is sparse on the positioning of the study. The theoretical relationship 
between terrorism and inclusive development can be engaged in three main strands: First, the 
relative deprivation theory that is developed by Gurr (1970) provides valuable insights into 
the nexus between terrorism and inclusive development (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015; Asongu 
et al., 2017a). If ‘relative deprivation’ can be defined as “individuals’ expectations of 
economic or political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods” (Piazza, 2006, 
p.162), then the theory “is grounded in the assumption that people who engage in rebellious 
political behavior are motivated principally by anger resulting from […] relative deprivation” 
(Muller & Weede, 1994, p. 40). Hence, rent seeking and confiscation of state resources by the 
elite (which is more pronounced in autocracies) can fuel frustration, anger and discontent over 
exclusive development. Such resentment could lead to aggression, political violence and 
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terrorism. In situations of relative deprivation, the poor or marginalised can use violent means 
of making their grievances loud and clear. Moreover, there is some consensus in the 
microeconomic literature that features typical of exclusive development (e.g. inequality, 
unemployment and poverty) endow terrorists’ entities with the opportunities of enriching their 
human resources with more qualified/skilled personnel (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; 
Benmelech et al., 2012).  
 Second, in accordance with Asongu et al. (2017a), while exclusive development is 
directly linked to terrorism because of deprivation and frustration, the lack of inclusive 
development could also be indirectly linked to terrorism through dilapidating social 
conditions. For example, restricted socio-economic and politico-economic progress can 
further fuel terrorism.  
The view of politico-economic participation is centered on the political influence of social 
segments in framing institutions for access by social groups to resources and distribution 
within society of these resources (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015). Under the scenario that power 
is withheld by a selected few, enough resources can be mobilised by them to create (or 
consolidate) institutions of politico-economic order that protect and promote their interests. 
Unhappy citizens at the lower socio-economic echelon then respond by violent means in order 
to change the institutional order or status quo. The employment of tactics of terror in the 
demand for more politico-economic participation has been substantially documented 
(Basuchoudhary &  Shughart, 2010; Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011).  
A plethora of socio-economic consequences have been documented to originate from 
inequality. As a case in point, Fosu (2008, 2009, 2010abc) has demonstrated that: inequality 
mitigates the accumulation of human capital that ultimately affects economic prosperity and 
that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of socio-economic inequality. 
It follows that terrorism could result from inequality. The socio-economic oriented narrative is 
consistent with the literature which maintains that diminishing socio-economic conditions 
increase the use of violence by citizens to make the grievances known (see Caruso & 
Schneider, 2011; Gries et al., 2011; Freytag et al., 2011).  
 Third, on the empirical front, the evidence is still very conflicting on the nexus 
between exclusive development and terrorism (or political violence) (Asongu et al., 2017a). 
No consensus has been established yet on the nexus between civil wars and inequality  “Over 
the past few years, prominent large-N studies of civil war seem to have reached a consensus 
that inequality does not increase the risk of civil war” (Østby, 2008, p. 143). Yet, some 
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studies have established that the likelihood of civil wars increases with income-inequality 
(Cederman et al., 2011; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015; Baten & Mumme, 2013).  
With regards to the linkage between inequality and terrorism, evidence from empirical 
literature is also controversial. While some of the existing literature does not provide a clear 
nexus between terrorism and inequality (see Piazza, 2006; Abadie, 2006; Li, 2005), another 
strand of the literature has established inequality to be a fundamental cause of terrorism 
(Piazza, 2011; 2013). With regards to relationships between transnational (versus domestic 
terrorism) and inequality, it is believed that transnational terrorism is related to grievances in 
the foreign policy of developed countries (Savun & Phillips, 2009), while domestic terrorism 
is considerably affected by grievances of an economic nature (Piazza, 2013).  
 Noticeably, the engaged literature has for the most part focused on the effect of 
governance on terrorism, the linkage between inclusive development and terrorism and the 
impact of military expenditure on terrorism. The present inquiry complements the existing 
literature by investigating the role of inclusive development and military expenditure in the 
effect of terrorism on governance.  
 
2.3. Intuition and theoretical underpinnings  
In this section, we discuss the theoretical intuition for the impact of terrorism on governance 
as well as the inclusion of interactions with inclusive growth and military expenditure. The 
discussion is articulated as follows: Firstly on the basis of the intuition and theoretical 
underpinnings as to why a country that is besieged by terrorist attacks could be concerned 
with the corresponding impact on governance (Laver & Shepsle, 1998; Williams, 2012). 
Secondly on how the policy variables used in this study can be used to dampen the potentially 
negative effect of terrorism on governance.  
 Considering the effect of terrorism on governance in the light of the governance 
variables used in this study, three perspectives are articulated: (i) Due to changing interests in 
constituencies, terrorism events can affect policies that are adopted by political parties. 
Consistent with Indridason (2008), political coalitions can be created in the face of terrorism 
incidents in view of adopting common strategies and policies against the scourge. Hence, 
terrorism can influence the political climate as well as the political agenda of political parties.  
Accordingly, there is a bulk of literature on the perspective that terrorism influences election 
anticipation, given that governing parties are likely to be punished by voters if adequate 
policies are not implemented to protect them against the externalities of terrorism (Berrebi & 
Klor, 2006; Siqueira & Sandler, 2007). Thus, the fact that terrorism influences political 
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governance within the frameworks of political stability/no violence and “voice & 
accountability” has been confirmed in the literature (Indridason, 2008; Williams, 2012). Some 
examples in which terrorism has affected political governance (from the perspectives of 
political stability/no “voice and accountability) include: Turkey, where terrorism influences 
the outcome of political elections (Kibris, 2010) and the USA,  in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks in 2001 (Langer & Cohen, 2005; Jacobson, 2003).  
(ii) Terrorism can affect economic governance (i.e. government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) because it shapes the ability of a government to formulate and implement policies 
that are necessary to promote the delivery of public goods and services. For instance, 
according to Tabor (2016), in the Delta region of Nigeria, the government has been 
constrained to improve the provision of public goods in the affected region. 
(iii) From the perspective of institutional governance, the presence of terrorism decreases 
opportunities for corruption-control and respect of the rule of law. This is the case of Libya 
where the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them is limited because of the prevailing levels of terrorism in the country. Moreover, the 
growth the Boko Haram of Nigeria is in regions where lawlessness is more apparent. Efobi 
and Asongu (2016) have recently established that terrorism increases corruption and decreases 
the rule of law.  Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017b) show that terrorism negatively influences 
both political governance and economic governance.  
Moreover, military expenditure and inclusive development have recently been 
established to mitigate terrorism. Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah (2018) have established 
that military expenditure can mitigate terrorism for positive development outcomes whereas 
Asongu et al. (2017a) have empirically demonstrated that military expenditure and inclusive 
development can effectively be used in the fight against terrorism.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 This study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 1998-2012 
from the Global Terrorism Database, African Development indicators (ADI) and World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank and the terrorism incidents from Enders et al. 
(2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012). The investigated periodicity ends in 2012 due to data 
availability constraints, notably: terrorism variables from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev 
et al. (2012) and macroeconomic and institutional indicators from the ADI of the World 
Bank.  
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The periodicity begins from 1998 because governance variables from the World Governance 
Indicators are only available from the year 1996. The motivation for beginning in 1998 is to 
have a symmetric computation of three-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI). The interest of 
employing NOI is to restrict over-identification that could substantially bias estimated 
coefficients (see estimation technique section) and mitigate short-term disturbances that can 
substantially loom (Islam, 1995, p. 323). Therefore, we have five three-year NOI: 1998-2000; 
2001-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2009 and 2010-2012. It is important to note that the first-two 
data points consist of only two observations because there are missing observations for 1997, 
1999 and 2001 in World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.  
 The dependent variables are six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
that have been employed in recent governance and development  literature (Gani, 2011; 
Asongu, 2015, 2016; Ajide & Raheem, 2016; Andrés et al., 2015; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; 
Tchamyou, 2017). Full definitions have been provided in Section 2.1. 
 Two main terrorism variables are employed, namely: domestic and transnational 
terrorism.  The definition of terrorism has also been provided in Section 2.1. Terrorism-
specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes all 
incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the venue country: implying that 
the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue country” (p.6). 
Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that concerns at least 
two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one 
country, but the victim and target is from another”.  The terrorism variables capture the 
number of yearly terrorism incidents registered in a country within a year. In order to mitigate 
mathematical issues linked to log-transforming zeros and to correct the positive data skew, the 
study takes natural logarithms of terrorism incidents by adding one to the base. A similar 
approach to transformation has been recently used by Choi and Salehyan (2013), 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Asongu et al. (2018b).  
 Two policy variables are employed, namely: inclusive development and military 
expenditure. The  choice of military expenditure is consistent with Feridun and Shahbaz  
(2010), while the inclusive development indicator which is the inequality adjusted human 
development index (IHDI) is justified by a recent stream of literature maintaining that 
adherence to and sympathy for terrorists’ organisations are fundamentally motivated by 
exclusive human development (Bass, 2014). Contemporary examples include Western-born 
and -educated youths joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) principally because 
they feel excluded in Western nations (Foster, 2014).  
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The choice of the IHDI as a proxy for inclusive development is consistent with recent African 
literature on inclusive development (Asongu et al., 2015). The IHDI represents the national 
average of achievements in three key areas, namely:  knowledge; health and long life and 
decent standards of living. Beside, accounting for average rewards in terms of wealth, 
education and health, the IHDI also controls for the distribution of underlying achievements 
among the population by accounting for mean values of each dimension with regards to 
inequality.  
In order to ensure that the estimated results are not biased by omitted variables, the 
study includes seven control variables: lagged governance indicator, inflation, education, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, internet penetration, government expenditure and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The quality of government has been documented to be 
positively related to information and communication technologies because they improve 
transparency and accountability (Snow, 2009; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et 
al., 2014).  High income nations have been documented to be linked to better quality of 
government in Africa (Asongu, 2012, p. 191). From intuition, increasing prices is very likely 
to positively influence governance standards because authorities are prompted to device and 
implement policies that control for inflation. Financial globalisation within the framework of 
FDI positively affects political governance both in developing (Lalountas et al., 2011) and 
African (Asongu, 2014) countries. Cheung and Chan (2008) and Lederman et al. (2005) have 
established that increased schooling boosts governance standards. Governance is also strongly 
associated with government expenditure (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Definitions of 
variables are provided in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in Appendix 2 and the 
correlation matrix in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Estimation specification  
 Five principal reasons motivate the choice of a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) (Asongu & De Moor, 2017; Tchamyou et al., 2018). First, the governance variables 
should be persistent. This is the case because, as apparent in Appendix 4, the correlation 
between governance variables and their first lags are higher than the rule of thumb threshold 
of 0.800 that is needed to establish persistence in dependent variables. Second, the number of 
countries (N) is higher than the number of years per country (T). Hence, the sample of the 
study is consistent with the N(53)>T(5) criterion. Third, the estimation strategy accounts for 
endogeneity in the all regressors. Fourth, cross-country differences are taken into account in 
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the estimation technique. Fifth, small sample biases that are typical of the ‘difference 
estimator’ are controlled-for in the system GMM technique. It is essentially for this fifth 
reason that the system GMM estimator from Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) has been established to be better that the difference GMM estimator from 
Arellano and Bond (1991) (see Bond et al., 2001).  
 Within the framework of this inquiry, the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) is adopted. In essence, instead of employing first differences, the estimation 
approach uses forward orthogonal deviations because the latter limits instrument proliferation 
(or restricts over-identification) and controls for cross-sectional dependence (see Baltagi, 
2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006; Boateng et al., 2018). A two-step estimation approach is 
adopted in place of the one-step strategy because it accounts for heteroscedasticity. It is 
interesting to note that the one-step approach is homoscedasticity-consistent.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where: tiG ,
 
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; tiT , , is a terrorism variable (domestic and transnational); tiP , , is a 
policy variable (inclusive development or military expenditure);
 
tiTP , , is the interaction 
between terrorism and a policy variable; 0
 
is a constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of 
autoregression; W  is the vector of control variables  (internet penetration, GDP growth, 
inflation, foreign direct investment, education and government expenditure);
 
i
 
is the 
country-specific effect; t
 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. 
 
3.2.2 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restriction 
 A robust GMM specification requires a discussion on issues pertaining to 
identification, simultaneity and exclusive restrictions. All independent indicators are 
suspected endogenous or predetermined variables (see Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu 
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& De Moor, 2017; Tchamyou, 2018). Hence, the gmmstyle is adopted for these variables and 
only years are treated as exogenous. The technique for treating the ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, 
eq(diff))’ because it is not likely for years to become endogenous in first-difference (see 
Roodman, 2009b).  
 In order to address the concern of simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as 
instruments for forward-differenced variables. Accordingly, Helmet transformations are 
performed in order to eliminate fixed effects that could affect the examined relationships. This 
strategy which is consistent with Love and Zicchino (2006) and Tchamyou and Asongu 
(2017) consists of obtaining forward mean-differences of variables. Thus, instead of 
subtracting the previous observation for the contemporaneous one (see Roodman, 2009b, p. 
104), the mean of all future observations are deducted from the variables.  
 The transformation enables orthogonal or parallel conditions between lagged values 
and forward-differenced values. Irrespective of the number of lags, in order to reduce data 
loss, with the exception of the last observation for each cross-section, the transformations are 
computed for all observations “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, 
they are valid as instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 104). Hence, the System GMM 
specification is also designed to address the endogeneity problem associated with control 
variables. 
 In the light of the above, among instrumental variables, years are considered 
exclusively exogenous and hence, affect governance only through the endogenous explaining 
indicators. The statistical relevance of the exclusive restriction is investigated with the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. In essence, the 
alternative hypothesis of the test should be rejected for the instruments to explain governance 
exclusively through the endogenous variables.  
Accordingly, while in the standard instrumental variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test means that the 
instruments do not elucidate  the dependent variable beyond the endogenous explaining 
variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), in the GMM approach with 
forward orthogonal deviations, the DHT is the information criterion used to assess if years 
exhibit strict exogeneity by explaining the dependent variables exclusively via the proposed 
channels. Hence, the exclusion restriction is confirmed if the null hypothesis of the DHT 
corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
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4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present findings corresponding to political 
governance, economic governance and institutional governance. For all three tables, four 
principal information criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with 
forward orthogonal deviations. First, the alternative hypothesis of the second-order Arellano 
and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference which argues for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should be rejected. Second, the null hypotheses of the Sargan 
and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be rejected because they are 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. Accordingly, 
whereas the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR 
is robust but weakened by instruments. For the purpose of restricting identification or limiting 
the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that for most specifications, instruments are 
lower than the number of cross-sections. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen 
OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also disclosed.  
 The findings are discussed in terms of marginal impacts and net effects and the latter 
effects are computed with the unconditional effect of terrorism and the conditional impact 
which is based on the interaction between the terrorism and policy variables. For instance in 
Table 1 on ‘linkages between governance, terrorism and policy variables’, in the second 
column, the unconditional impact of domestic terrorism is -0.072, the conditional impact from 
the interaction between domestic terrorism and military expenditure is 0.034, while the net 
effect of the role of ‘military expenditure in domestic terrorism for political governance’ is 
0.0043 ([2.245 × 0.034] + -0.072)4. This approach to net effect from interactive regressions is 
consistent with recent literature on the use of policy variables to modulate the effect of policy 
syndromes on development outcomes, notably: the role of information and communication 
technology (ICT) in mitigating the effect of environmental degradation on inclusive 
development (Asongu et al., 2017b) and the relevance of ICT in dampening the potentially 
negative effect of globalisation on environmental outcomes (Asongu, 2018).  
                                                 
4
 2.245 is the mean value of military expenditure. It is important to note that, in the interpretation of findings 
from interactive regressions, we overlook the signs of constituents and focus on net effects because the concern 
of multicollinearity is overlooked in the specifications. Brambor et al.  (2006) aptly discuss this concern of 
multicollinearity. It is also relevant to note that when variables with a high degree of substitution are entered into 
the same specification, there is a conflict and not all variables emerge from the regression output with the 
expected sign (see Beck et al., 2003). This is why net effects must be computed for an overall effect.   
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 The following main findings can be established for Table 1 on political governance 
and terrorism. The negative effect of domestic terrorism on voice and accountability is 
significantly mitigated by military expenditure because the   marginal (or conditional) and net 
effects are positive. Most of the control variables are significant with expected signs.  
 
Table 1: Political governance and terrorism   
         
 Dependent variable: Political Governance 
         
 
Voice and Accountability  (VA) Political Stability  (PS) 
 Role of Military Expend. Role of Inclusive Dev.  Role of Military Expend. Role of Inclusive Dev.  
 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Constant  0.100** 0.133* -0.078* -0.097** -0.418*** -0.170* -0.175** -0.197*** 
 (0.022) (0.051) (0.082) (0.017) (0.007) (0.078) (0.027) (0.003) 
VA(-1) 0.971*** 0.916*** 0.977*** 0.955*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
PS(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.851*** 0.828*** 0.843*** 0.823*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism (DT) -0.072*** --- -0.061 --- -0.111*** --- -0.175 --- 
 (0.000)  (0.231)  (0.002)  (0.179)  
Transnational Terrorism (TT) --- -0.085*** --- -0.013 --- -0.354*** --- -0.350** 
  (0.004)  (0.901)  (0.000)  (0.016) 
Military Expenditure -0.018 -0.017 --- --- 0.070 0.074** --- --- 
 (0.437) (0.494)   (0.124) (0.013)   
Inclusive development --- --- -0.045 -0.003*** --- --- -0.032 -0.0001 
   (0.272) (0.000)   (0.703) (0.804) 
Military Expenditure× DT 0.034*** --- --- --- 0.002 --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.895)    
Inclusive development×DT --- --- 0.113 --- --- --- 0.084 --- 
   (0.312)    (0.715)  
Military Expenditure×TT --- -0.010 --- --- --- -0.035 --- --- 
  (0.601)    (0.253)   
Inclusive development×TT --- --- --- -0.097 --- --- --- -0.157 
    (0.664)    (0.580) 
Internet  0.008*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.001 0.010*** -0.002** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.297) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.006* 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.017*** 0.010 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.085) (0.814) (0.322) (0.207) (0.008) (0.130) (0.524) (0.754) 
Inflation   0.015*** 0.013*** 0.002 0.004 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.004 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.322) (0.107) (0.000) (0.002) (0.178) (0.000) 
Foreign investment  -0.004** -0.001 -0.0007 -0.003*** -0.001 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0007 
 (0.027) (0.586) (0.656) (0.005) (0.517) (0.822) (0.922) (0.880) 
Education    -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.0002 -0.0006 0.002* -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.581) (0.146) (0.069) (0.001) (0.000) (0.537) 
Government Expenditure -0.0001 0.0006** 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.885) (0.029) (0.647) (0.750) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
  
 
  
    
Net effects  0.0043 na na na na na na na 
         
AR(1) (0.016) (0.043) (0.002) (0.028) (0.104) (0.104) (0.082) (0.139) 
AR(2) (0.370) (0.772) (0.851) (0.967) (0.461) (0.858) (0.407) (0.977) 
Sargan OIR (0.531) (0.527) (0.124) (0.373) (0.054) (0.064) (0.031) (0.114) 
Hansen OIR (0.194) (0.289) (0.365) (0.369) (0.600) (0.523) (0.330) (0.325) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.582) (0.593) (0.345) (0.708) (0.629) (0.395) (0.815) (0.727) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.112) (0.187) (0.401) (0.213) (0.493) (0.560) (0.145) (0.171) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.363) (0.540) (0.448) (0.507) (0.495) (0.647) (0.557) (0.292) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.061) (0.046) (0.195) (0.129) (0.780) (0.164) (0.061) (0.479) 
         
Fisher  10814.02*** 14877.3*** 122063*** 256325*** 14527.81*** 2751.02*** 36204.3*** 1.37e+7*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  44 44 43 43 44 44 43 43 
Observations  124 124 121 121 124 124 121 121 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable because at least one coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effect is not significant. Expend: Expenditure. Dev: Development. 
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Table 2: Economic governance and terrorism   
         
 Dependent variable: Economic Governance 
         
 
Regulation Quality   (RQ) Government Effectiveness   (GE) 
 Role of Military Expend. Role of Inclusive Dev.  Role of Military Expend. Role of Inclusive Dev.  
 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Constant  -0.313*** -0.228*** -0.260*** -0.034 -0.221*** -0.243*** -0.163*** -0.159*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.394) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
RQ(-1) 0.823*** 0.904*** 0.839*** 0.888*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
GE(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.938*** 0.922*** 0.873*** 0.884*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism (DT) 0.031** --- -0.018*** --- -0.025 --- -0.145*** --- 
 (0.038)  (0.005)  (0.140)  (0.000)  
Transnational Terrorism (TT) --- 0.044 --- 0.204*** --- 0.044 --- 0.032 
  (0.342)  (0.000)  (0.140)  (0.628) 
Military Expenditure -0.016 0.049*** --- --- 0.022 0.087*** --- --- 
 (0.334) (0.002)   (0.184) (0.000)   
Inclusive development --- --- -0.004*** 0.010*** --- --- -0.082*** 0.001*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure× DT 0.006 --- --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- 
 (0.493)    (0.265)    
Inclusive development×DT --- --- (omitted) --- --- --- 0.229*** --- 
       (0.000)  
Military Expenditure×TT --- -0.074*** --- --- --- -0.109*** --- --- 
  (0.001)    (0.000)   
Inclusive development×TT --- --- --- -0.621*** --- --- --- -0.321** 
    (0.000)    (0.024) 
Internet  -0.006** 0.0005 -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.003*** 0.0002 -0.0008 0.001** 
 (0.023) (0.450) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.819) (0.172) (0.030) 
GDP growth  -0.008** -0.005** 0.003 -0.005 0.008** 0.0007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.042) (0.271) (0.155) (0.021) (0.795) (0.121) (0.117) 
Inflation   0.0009 -0.001 0.0006 -0.003*** 0.004 0.0003 -0.002 -0.0003 
 (0.772) (0.612) (0.647) (0.002) (0.199) (0.880) (0.185) (0.723) 
Foreign investment  0.001 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001** -0.003*** -0.0008 -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.187) (0.006) (0.002) (0.034) (0.000) (0.397) (0.029) (0.161) 
Education    0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.0001 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.800) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000) (0.050) 
Government Expenditure 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 0.001*** 0.0005 0.001*** -0.000005 0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.986) (0.105) 
 
    
 
 
  
Net effects na na na -0.337 na na 0.054 na 
         
AR(1) (0.395) (0.172) (0.519) (0.112) (0.396) (0.197) (0.604) (0.625) 
AR(2) (0.038) (0.137) (0.639) (0.257) (0.133) (0.109) (0.146) (0.077) 
Sargan OIR (0.451) (0.411) (0.011) (0.298) (0.006) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.384) (0.438) (0.018) (0.700) (0.300) (0.289) (0.276) (0.337) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.685) (0.410) (0.648) (0.151) (0.686) (0.724) (0.584) (0.365) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.236) (0.443) (0.005) (0.943) (0.165) (0.145) (0.180) (0.352) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.483) (0.315) (0.131) (0.587) (0.301) (0.342) (0.210) (0.276) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.177) (0.883) (0.005) (0.847) (0.355) (0.224) (0.667) (0.606) 
         
Fisher  1140.16*** 3220.94*** 2.07e+6*** 6.15e+6*** 2167.52*** 9778.05*** 135594*** 290830*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  44 44 43 43 44 44 43 43 
Observations  124 124 121 121 124 124 121 121 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable because at least one coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effect is not significant. Omitted: omitted due to multicollinearity. Expend: Expenditure. Dev: Development. 
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Table 3: Institutional governance and terrorism   
         
 Dependent variable: Institutional Governance 
         
 
Rule of Law   (RL) Corruption Control    (CC) 
 Role of Military Expend. Role of Inclusive Dev.  Role of Military Expend. Role of Inclusive Dev.  
 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Constant  -0.077 -0.076** -0.260*** -0.133** 0.008 -0.032 -0.102** -0.007 
 (0.103) (0.043) (0.000) (0.011) (0.884) (0.415) (0.018) (0.863) 
RL(-1) 0.890*** 0.851*** 0.839*** 0.870*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
CC(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.885*** 0.950*** 0.832*** 0.866*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism (DT) -0.071*** --- -0.018*** --- -0.001 --- 0.013 --- 
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.927)  (0.176)  
Transnational Terrorism (TT) --- -0.054** --- -0.141*** --- 0.087*** --- 0.253*** 
  (0.019)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Military Expenditure -0.034*** 0.003 --- --- -0.079*** 0.024*** --- --- 
 (0.002) (0.793)   (0.001) (0.008)   
Inclusive development --- --- -0.004*** -0.002*** --- --- -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure× DT 0.049*** --- --- --- 0.019** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.015)    
Inclusive development×DT --- --- (omitted) --- --- --- (omitted) --- 
         
Military Expenditure×TT --- -0.018 --- --- --- -0.074*** --- --- 
  (0.139)    (0.000)   
Inclusive development×TT --- --- --- 0.137 --- --- --- -0.688*** 
    (0.121)    (0.000) 
Internet  -0.001 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.003 0.001 -0.0007 0.002*** 
 (0.358) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.396) (0.505) (0.008) 
GDP growth  -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 (0.275) (0.653) (0.271) (0.924) (0.116) (0.353) (0.001) (0.008) 
Inflation   0.0005 0.0003 0.0006 0.002 -0.007* -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.784) (0.805) (0.647) (0.147) (0.051) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign investment  0.001 0.0008 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002* 0.002*** 0.0006 
 (0.140) (0.317) (0.002) (0.046) (0.310) (0.082) (0.000) (0.437) 
Education    0.003*** 0.00007 0.003*** 0.0007* 0.003** 0.0006 0.002*** 0.0005 
 (0.004) (0.928) (0.000) (0.099) (0.018) (0.424) (0.000) (0.181) 
Government Expenditure 0.0007*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
        
Net effects 0.039 na na na na -0.079 na -0.346 
         
AR(1) (0.333) (0.104) (0.519) (0.453) (0.061) (0.070) (0.089) (0.099) 
AR(2) (0.767) (0.454) (0.639) (0.503) (0.680) (0.551) (0.480) (0.331) 
Sargan OIR (0.206) (0.009) (0.011) (0.077) (0.867) (0.751) (0.546) (0.273) 
Hansen OIR (0.326) (0.313) (0.018) (0.298) (0.331) (0.712) (0.135) (0.207) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.464) (0.405) (0.648) (0.329) (0.536) (0.577) (0.404) (0.200) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.280) (0.297) (0.005) (0.328) (0.251) (0.668) (0.106) (0.306) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.261) (0.413) (0.131) (0.320) (0.321) (0.745) (0.444) (0.490) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.627) (0.157) (0.005) (0.297) (0.399) (0.336) (0.012) (0.026) 
         
Fisher  33838.9*** 4334.01*** 2.07e+6*** 51724.9*** 1329.78*** 1904.75*** 949900*** 108926*** 
Instruments  42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Countries  44 44 43 43 44 44 43 43 
Observations  124 124 121 121 124 124 121 121 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable because at least one coefficient needed for the computation of net 
effect is not significant. Omitted: omitted due to multicollinearity. Expend: Expenditure. Dev: Development.  
 
 
In Table 2 on the linkage between economic governance and terrorism, two specifications are 
invalid because either the instruments are invalid and/or autocorrelation is still apparent in the 
residuals. First, the net effect of inclusive development in reducing transnational (domestic) 
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terrorism for better regulation quality (government effectiveness) is negative (positive). 
Second, there is some evidence of a negative threshold in the interaction between: (i) military 
expenditure and transnational terrorism for regulation quality on the one hand and 
government effectiveness on the other hand and; (ii) inclusive development and transnational 
terrorism for government effectiveness. A negative threshold effect is established when the 
unconditional effect of terrorism is not significant while the conditional effect from the 
interaction between a policy and terrorism is negative. In other words, a certain level of the 
policy variable is required for the underlying terrorism indicator to have an adverse effect on 
governance.  
Most of the significant control variables display expected signs. Contingency of 
control variables on specifications is not uncommon as these also depend on the unobserved 
heterogeneity and specifications.  The relevance of growth, education and internet penetration 
are contingent on the underlying. All these variables can both increase and decrease 
governance. There is no consensus on the effect of education on governance. Evidence on the 
absence of this consensus and corresponding studies arguing for both positive and negative 
effects is documented by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a). Moreover, the internet can be 
used to improve governance standards (e.g. through freedom of expression) or employed to 
decrease governance standards (e.g. via censorship). Finally, exclusive growth naturally 
decreases governance standards whereas inclusive growth has the opposite effect. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 3 on the linkage between 
institutional governance and terrorism: (i) the net effect of military expenditure in reducing  
domestic (resp. transnational) terrorism for enhanced rule of law (control of corruption) is 
positive (resp. negative); while the net impact of inclusive development in reducing 
transnational terrorism for better corruption-control is  negative and; (ii) there is some 
evidence of a positive  threshold in the interaction between military expenditure and domestic  
terrorism for more control of corruption. A positive threshold effect is established when the 
unconditional effect of terrorism is not significant, while the conditional effect from the 
interaction between a policy variable and terrorism is positive. In other words, a certain level 
of the policy variable is required for the underlying terrorism indicator to have a positive 
effect on governance.  
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
 After comparing and contrasting the findings of Tables 1-3, two tendencies are worth 
elucidating further, notably: (i) the negative net effect on governance (regulation quality and 
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corruption-control) when inclusive human development is used to reduce terrorism and (ii) 
the positive net impact on governance (“voice and accountability” and rule of law) when 
military expenditure is used to reduce domestic terrorism. 
 First, negative net effects from interactions with inclusive development show that 
there is a direct implication from exclusive development and an indirect implication from the 
role of the elite in policies of exclusive development.  Inclusive development in the sampled 
countries may not be enough to mitigate the potentially negative effect of terrorism on 
governance. This is not surprising given that a recent World Bank report on the attainment of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme 
poverty has been decreasing in regions of the world with the exception of Africa where about 
45% of the countries in the Sub-Saharan African region were still substantially off-track from 
the MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015). This is in sharp contrast to the 
appealing statistics of the continent enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence that 
began in the mid 1990s (see Fosu, 2015; Kuada, 2015).  
Further, the role of inclusive development in the overall negative effect could imply 
that in spite of sampled countries’ efforts towards enhancing the equitable distribution of the 
fruits of economic growth, the impacts may be counter-productive owing to frustrations from 
some spheres of influence that are unsympathetic with the equitable distribution policies. The 
underlying influence is more likely among the elite who could be concerned that such 
redistributive policies negatively affect their interests. Within this framework, grievances and 
discontent over the inequitable distribution of the fruits of economic development is not from 
poor factions of the population. On the contrary, such resentment is from the elite that for the 
most part are situated in the upper- and middle-income strata. In essence, such elite could be 
concerned and infuriated over the more equitable distribution of economic resources and 
gains. The elite can also fund violent activities in view of creating instability so that 
eventually a terror-panic environment creates the necessary conditions for them to tailor and 
reinvent existing institutions to the protection of their rents and interests.  
 The above practical implication relating to inclusive development is broadly in 
accordance with narratives on the African middle class which is not sympathetic to concerns 
about inclusiveness because of her dependence on state resources and preference for specific 
markets (see Poulton, 2014). Moreover, the corresponding stand of literature is consistent 
with the perspective that the African middle class is very likely to employ skillful internal 
(e.g. civil unrest/war) and external  tactics (e.g. terrorism) in view of hampering socio-
economic transformations, with the ulitmate ambition of maintaining a tight grip on politico-
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economic power (see  Poulton, 2014: Resnick, 2015). Hence, in the light of the narrative, the 
elite and middle class could coordinate activities that result in temporal chaos and unrest with 
the goal of reinventing and tailoring institutions that work towards protecting their interests. 
The inference is in accordance with the perspective that such frustrations for midlle and upper 
classes are substantially associated with political connections by the elite, as opposed to the 
middle class and elite who are consolidating their income using level-playing filed activities 
like politically-free entreprising and innovation. The discouse is also in accordance with the 
skeptical narrative on the influence of the middle class in governance transformations in 
Africa (see Rodrik, 2015). 
 Second, the appealing role of the military spending in reducing the potentially 
negative effect of domesitc terrorism challenges the existing literature which maintains that 
military expenditure is insufficient in fighting terrorism because the effect might be 
counterproductive (see  Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010).  
  The established evidence of terrorism significantly influencing governance is broadly 
consistent with studies which have shown that terror events affect political outcomes (Berrebi 
& Klor 2006; Siqueira & Sandler 2007), notably: terrorism affects the constitution of 
governments and voters’ perspectives (Jacobson, 2003; Langer & Cohen, 2005) and terrorism 
has some leverage on government survival (Indridason et al., 2008; Williams, 2012).  
 
5. Conclusion and further research directions  
 The study has investigated the role of inclusive human development and military 
expenditure in the effect of terrorism on governance. It is based on 53 African countries for 
the period 1998-2012 and interactive Generalised Method of Moments is employed. Six 
governance indicators from the World Bank and two terrorism variables are used, namely: 
domestic and transnational terrorism dynamics.  The following findings are established. First, 
on political governance, the negative effect of domestic terrorism on voice and accountability 
is significantly mitigated by military expenditure because the marginal (or conditional) and 
net effects are positive. Second, on economic governance, the net effect of inclusive 
development in reducing transnational (resp. domestic) terrorism for better regulation quality 
(government effectiveness) is negative (resp. positive). Third, with regards to institutional 
governance, the net effect of military expenditure in reducing domestic (resp. transnational) 
terrorism for enhanced rule of law (control of corruption) is positive (resp. negative) while the 
net impact of inclusive development in reducing transnational terrorism for better corruption-
control is negative.  
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 A caveat to this study is that governance variables are inherently subjective since they 
are based on perceptions. Another criticism put forward can be that the short periodicities do 
not capture changes for most countries, with the exception of countries which experience 
substantial governance crises and reforms. Unfortunately, the current data is limiting in that 
governance indicators are only available from the year 1996. As more data become available, 
the highlighted issues can be addressed in greater detail. This recommendation also extends to 
the issue of missing observations apparent in the study.  
 Given the diversity of signs and significance levels, the inference of causality may be 
questionable which could require the substitution of terms like “cause” or “effect” with terms 
like “association” or “link”. The overall effect is based on net effects which may be positive 
and negative for certain government dynamics. Hence we do not expect the net effects to be 
uniform in sign. However, important tendencies (such as variations in the signs of net effects) 
emerge that raise important questions for future research.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic 
terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln) Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Inclusive 
development    
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index  (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment   
FDI Foreign direct investment net inflows  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education   Educ Secondary school enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government 
Expenditure  
G.Exp. Government’s Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  UNDP: United Nations Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.551 0.929 -3.297 1.087 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.723 -2.155 1.009 265 
Government Effectiveness  -0.723 0.620 -2.354 0.823 265 
Regulation Quality  -0.695 0.638 -2.630 0.906 265 
Rule of Law -0.706 0.660 -2.595 1.032 265 
Control of Corruption  -0.602 0.577 -1.848 0.971 265 
Domestic terrorism  0.401 0.805 0.000 4.781 265 
Transnational terrorism 0.203 0.451 0.000 2.802 265 
Inclusive development  0.872 4.210 0.161 45.231 220 
Military Expenditure  2.245 2.899 0.151 35.846 231 
Internet penetration  4.766 8.022 0.002 51.174 264 
GDP growth  4.706 4.230 -8.149 32.265 259 
Inflation   10.012 25.435 -6.934 275.983 242 
Foreign direct investment   5.125 7.175 -4.265 52.398 259 
Education (secondary)   42.416 25.022 5.608 111.454 201 
Government Expenditure  8.715 22.623 -62.668 206.7 206 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix  
                 
Governance variables Control variables Terrorism variables Policy variables  
                 
PS VA GE RQ CC RL Internet FDI GDPg Inflation Educ  G.Exp. Domter Tranter IHDI Military  
                 
1.000 0.658 0.643 0.608 0.771 0.758 0.084 0.033 -0.074 -0.234 0.368 -0.188 -0.605 -0.584 0.029 -0.530 PS 
 1.000 0.719 0.730 0.715 0.773 0.187 -0.092 -0.184 -0.049 0.390 -0.126 -0.263 -0.276 0.204 -0.266 VA 
  1.000 0.890 0.872 0.892 0.303 -0.178 -0.184 -0.112 0.570 -0.143 -0.225 -0.271 0.237 -0.245 GE 
   1.000 0.799 0.852 0.285 -0.226 -0.263 -0.130 0.481 -0.218 -0.186 -0.246 0.210 -0.216 RQ 
    1.000 0.888 0.224 -0.099 -0.269 -0.166 0.523 -0.172 -0.294 -0.335 0.207 -0.312 CC 
     1.000 0.302 -0.129 -0.241 -0.161 0.583 -0.194 -0.304 -0.308 0.134 -0.299 RL 
      1.000 -0.103 -0.023 -0.062 0.535 -0.021 0.146 0.164 0.018 0.052 Internet 
       1.000 0.482 0.105 -0.066 0.106 -0.133 -0.082 -0.056 -0.088 FDI 
        1.000 0.124 -0.220 0.249 -0.006 0.007 -0.078 0.157 GDPg 
         1.000 -0.003 0.195 0.181 0.247 0.0002 0.030 Inflation 
          1.000 -0.061 0.036 -0.071 0.240 -0.082 Educ 
           1.000 0.095 0.221 -0.038 -0.042 G.Exp. 
            1.000 0.699 0.090 0.661 Domter 
             1.000 0.052 0.107 Tranter 
              1.000 0.052 IHDI 
               1.000 Military 
                 
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Internet: Internet  
Penetration. Educ: Secondary School enrolment.. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth. G.Exp: Government Expenditure. Domter: Domestic Terrorism.  
Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. Military: Military Expenditure.  
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Appendix 4: Persistence of governance  
       
 PS VA GE RQ CC RL 
PS(-1) 0.925      
VA(-1)  0.953     
GE(-1)   0.965    
RQ(-1)    0.966   
CC(-1)     0.936  
RL(-1)      0.966 
       
PS: Political Stability/Non violence.  PS(-1): Lagged value of Political Stability/Non violence.VA: Voice & Accountability.  
GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. 
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